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COMMENT
RIGHTS OF EUROPEAN UNION
DEPOSITORS UNDER
ARTICLE
17 OF THE CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AFTER
THE CYPRUS BAIL-OUT
Paul Artemou*

INTRODUCTION
Banks in the Republic of Cyprus began to deteriorate in
2010 due to risky investments with Greece.1 The two largest
Cypriot banks, Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) and Bank of
Cyprus (BoC), undertook losses, which made the country
economically unstable.2 After requesting financial assistance
from the Eurogroup and International Monetary Fund, there
was an agreement for Cyprus to raise € 4.2 billion in return for
a € 10 billion bailout.3 Part of the agreement in raising the
funds was a levy of bank deposits towards the recapitalization
needs of the two largest banks.4
The Cyprus bail-in was unpopular and received much
criticism because of its unprecedented and seemingly unfair
condition. In this paper, I will investigate to what extent
* J.D. Candidate 2016, Pace University School of Law.
1 Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, Former Governor, Central
Bank
of
Cyprus
(Mar.
28,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013
/03/interview-athanasiosorphanides; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, at 7 (May 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/20
13/pdf/ocp149_en.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and troika,
EKATHIMERINI, Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/ 4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1
_1_25/03/2013_489702.
4 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1.
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Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (Charter) protects European Union depositors
from a ‘bail-in’ obligation using Cyprus as a case study. I
believe that the levying of bank deposits, as a condition of a
bail-out of Cyprus by the EU did not violate Article 17 of the
Charter. However, I will argue that while the obligation was
legal, the European Union should hold a higher standard for
bank deposits with regard to Article 17 protection because of
the special nature of bank deposits, and for the preservation of
confidence in the EU banking system.
THE ‘CYPRUS BAIL-IN’
Cyprus Economic Crisis
When Cyprus introduced the euro in 2008, the economy
was thriving, and the island developed into a regional financial
center.5 However, poor risk management practices, delay
tactics made by the Cypriot government in the impending
economic crisis, and excessive concentration of investments in
Greece contributed to a decline in the sustainability of the
financial sector.6
The largest banks in Cyprus are Cyprus Popular Bank
(Laiki) and The Bank of Cyprus (BoC).7 Laiki and BoC engaged
in substantial expansions in Greece, specifically in foreign
sovereign debt, leaving them exposed to the adverse
macroeconomic developments there.8 The exposure of Laiki
and BoC to the Greek sovereign debt loan book led to
increasing levels of non-performing loans within their domestic
5 Id. at 9 (Macroeconomic imbalances included high current account deficits,
lagging exports, significant losses of price/cost and non-price/cost competitiveness,
mainly due to wage indexation, delays in the introduction of productivity-andcompetition-enhancing structural reforms and the longer term impact on competitiveness
and entrepreneurship of an oversized public sector. Strong net inflows of foreign capital
(mainly deposits) allowed to the current account deficit to grow, while stoking a credit
boom in the domestic economy. Banks’ credit policy has also been responsible for the
prevailing imbalances); Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, supra note 1;
see also Athanasios Orphanides, What Happened in Cyprus? The Economic
Consequences of the Last Communist Government in Europe, Special Paper 232, LSE
Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series, July 2014.
6 Id. at 11.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 12; see also Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, supra note 1.
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portfolios.9 Losses due to these rising non-performing loans10
mounted up causing negative effects on bank capital.11
In May 2011, the Cypriot government lost access to the
international markets, and in October 2011, Laiki Bank and
BoC, who had major operations in Greece, lost close to € 4.5
billion after European leaders executed a haircut of Greek
government bonds.12 Although the Cypriot government tried to
step in to limit the damage,13 the damage was already
apparent. That same year, the Cypriot government secured a
bilateral loan from Russia in the amount of € 2.5 billion with
4.5% interest to keep the financial sector afloat.14
The Cypriot authorities formally requested financial
assistance from the European Union and the International
Monetary Fund on June 25, 2012.15 A joint committee of the
European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and
European Central Bank, also known as the Troika, negotiated
the conditions of the financial assistance.16 An agreement was
reached on April 2, 2013 on a comprehensive policy package for
the period 2012-16, supporting financing for a total of € 10
billion in return for Cyprus raising an expected € 4.2 billion on
its own.17 On April 24th, Cyprus was granted the financial
9

Id.
See INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonperformingloan.asp
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (a nonperforming loan is “[a] sum of borrowed money upon
which the debtor has not made his or her scheduled payments for at least 90 days. A
nonperforming loan is either in default or close to being in default. Once a loan is
nonperforming, the odds that it will be repaid in full are considered to be substantially
lower. If the debtor starts making payments again on a nonperforming loan, it becomes a
re-performing loan, even if the debtor has not caught up on all the missed payments.”).
11 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 13.
12 Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, supra note 1; see also Stavros
A. Zenios, Fairness and Reflexivity in the Cyprus Bail-In, WHARTON FIN. INST. CTR. 1, 2
n.2 (2014), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/14/14-04.pdf (describing that
European leaders wiped out around 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector
held. The “private sector involvement” exchanged Greek government bonds (GGB) with
new long-term GGB and European Stability Fund (EFSF) bonds with a nominal discount
of around 50% and much higher fair value discount. This took place on July 21 and
October 26, 2011”).
13 See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Kabir Chibber, Who are the Troika that Greece depends on?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 4,
2011 http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15149626.
17 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1; see
10

3

5 PAUL ARTEMOU (DO NOT DELETE)

208

8/10/2016 9:53 AM

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 28:1

assistance on the basis of the agreed Memorandum of
Understanding.18 The Memorandum of Understanding19
outlined that the funds to be raised by Cyprus would be done
through a restructuring of BoC and the dissolution of Laiki
involving levies on bank deposits.20 On April 25th, the Council
adopted a decision under Article 136 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of Europe21 containing the main elements of the
macroeconomic adjustment programme to be implemented by
Cyprus.22 On April 26th, a Memorandum of Understanding,
consistent with the said-decision, was signed by the Cypriot
authorities and the Commission. The Cypriot House of
Representatives endorsed the programme on April 30, 2013.23
Provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding
According to the Memorandum of Understanding on
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality in the Cyprus
agreement, there are four aspects on the restructuring plan of
Laiki and BoC.24
First, there would be an upfront deleveraging of the

Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and Troika, EKATHIMERINI,
(Mar.
25,
2013),
http://www.ekathimerini.com/149669/article/ekathimerini/news/eurogroup-signs-off-onbailout-agreement-reached-by-cyprus-and-troika.
18 Id.
19 The Memorandum of Understanding describes a binding bilateral or multilateral
agreement between two or more parties.
20 Rick Newman, The Cyprus Bailout Does the Unthinkable, Vaporizes Bank
Deposits, U.S. NEWS, (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
blogs/rick-newman/2013/03/25/the-cyprus-bailout-does-the-unthinkable-vaporizes-bankdeposits; see Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and Troika,
EKATHIMERINI, (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ekathimerini.com/149669/article/
ekathimerini/news/eurogroup-signs-off-on-bailout-agreement-reached-by-cyprus-andtroika.
21 See FAQ – Financial Assistance for Cyprus, FINANCIAL STABILITY MECHANISM, at
4
(May
2013),
http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20on%20Cyprus%
20130520132.
pdf.
22 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 37.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 39; see also Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy
Conditionality, CYPRUS MINISTRY OF FINANCE at 7, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/
mof.nsf/final%20MOUf.pdf.
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banks.25 All Greek related assets and liabilities of the two main
banks were “carved-out” and acquired by the Greek bank
Piraeus Bank,26 achieving an immediate upfront deleveraging
while risk-weighted assets declined substantially, thereby
resulting in a lower capital requirement.27
Second, there would be an immediate bail-in of some € 1.4
billion of subordinated debt.28 All insured deposits (deposits
below €100,000) at Laiki, together with Cypriot and United
Kingdom assets were moved to BoC.29 Uninsured deposits
(deposits over €100,000) in Laiki, together with the remaining
assets and the foreign subsidiaries, remained in the bank and
were to be liquidated over time.30 Simultaneously, the
uninsured deposits at the BoC were subject to an immediate
bail-in of 37.5%, which converted the deposits into Class A
shares with full voting and dividend rights to provide the
largest part of the capital needs of the bank.31 Another 22.5% of
the uninsured deposits were to be frozen to ensure that the
bank is properly capitalized to the necessary standard.32
Should the bank turn out to be over-capitalized, the excess will
be unfrozen and returned to the depositors.33 The resolution of
Laiki and the consolidation of BoC as the leading Cypriot bank
resulted in a further immediate deleveraging of the financial
sector.34 The capital needs of Laiki and of BoC, which together
totaled about € 10 billion have been covered, exclusively
through the contributions of uninsured depositors with full

25

The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 46.
Id. at 42; see also Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy
Conditionality, supra note 24, at 8.
27 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 42.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 42, 73; see also Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic
Policy Conditionality, supra note 24, at 8.
31 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 74;
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, supra note
24, at 8.
32 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 74;
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, supra note
24, at 8.
33 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 74.
34 Id at 42.
26
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contribution of equity shareholders and bond holders.35
Third, BoC and Laiki are subject to an independent
valuation of their assets, as required by the bank resolution
framework. This was to see whether the banks were capitalized
sufficiently and whether more uninsured deposits were to be
converted.36
Finally, the Cyprus Central Bank appoints a new Board of
Directors and an acting Chief Executive Officer until Bank of
Cyprus’ new shareholders are organized in a general meeting.
The Board of Directors is responsible to restructure a plan
defining the bank’s business objectives and credit policies.37
DEPOSITOR’S RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
General
The relationship between the banker and the customer is
generally a contractual one. When a deposit account is opened
at a depositary institution, the relationship between the bank
and the customer is governed by the contract between the
customer and the institution and by applicable statutes and
regulations.38 Essentially, the bank owes the customer the
money, therefore making the bank a debtor of the customer.39
The bank is obligated to follow the customer’s instructions
and is considered as an agent of the customer. However, a bank
generally does not owe its customer any fiduciary duties, yet
this fiduciary duty may be created in some situations.40 Banks
generally have a duty to act in good faith and use ordinary care
while dealing with their customers under common law.41
The terms and conditions in Cypriot commercial banks
may include provisions such as; availability of banking
facilities and services, customer’s instructions to the bank,
customer privacy, expenses, fiduciary deposits, fees and other

35
36
37

Id.
Id. at 74-75.
Id.

38 MARK BUDNITZ ET AL., CONSUMER BANKING AND PAYMENTS LAW
39 Id.
40
41

14 (5th ed. 2013).

Id.
Id. It is important to note that Cyprus follows English common law.
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administrative provisions.42
Banking general terms and conditions generally have
provisions that authorize deposits held in the name of the
customer with the bank to be used as fiduciary deposits. 43
Fiduciary deposits allow the bank to make deposits in any
banking institution, in the Bank’s name, but for the account
and at the risk of the customer.44 Customers also generally
agree that the bank will not be liable for any losses based on
placement of deposit., The customer bears the risk of any
default by the bank and for any losses resulting from or related
to any such default or any acts or omissions of the bank in
relation to the making, maintenance and management of the
fiduciary deposits and their value or the fluctuation of such
value or any other matters pertaining to the fiduciary
deposits.45
Furthermore, most terms and conditions contain a force
majeure clause which states that the bank will not be liable for
damages caused as a result of its services being suspended due
to the actions of any authority, Cypriot or foreign, strike, lock
out, force majeure or any other reasons not proved to be a
willful act by the Bank. The same applies in the event that
there is material cause for the Bank to suspend or limit,
completely or partially, its services for certain days or for a
certain time.46
Deposit Guarantee Schemes
Cyprus created The Cyprus Deposit Protection and
Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme (Deposit
Protection Scheme) which insures depositors up to € 100,000 in
the event banks become insolvent.47 The European Union
42

General Terms and Conditions, Laiki Bank, Nov. 2012 (11th Ed.).
Id.
44 Id.
45
Id. at art. 25, § 5.
46 Id.
47 Informative Leaflet Addressed to the Covered Institution’s Depositors on the
Protection Afforded to them by the Cyprus Deposit Protection and Resolution of Credit
and
other
Institutions
Scheme,
BANK OF
CYPRUS
1,
2
(2013),
http://www.bankofcyprus.com.cy/Documents/Cyprus/Org_Methods/Banking_Codes_Sch
emes/Eng/10-0489E.pdf [hereinafter Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the
Protection].
43
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established Directive 94/19/EC,48 which all Members of the
European Economic Area49 are required to follow.50 The
purpose of the Deposit Protection Scheme is to compensate
depositors of covered institutions, which pay contributions to
the respective deposit protection funds, in the event that a
covered institution is unable to repay its depositors.51 On the
other hand, it may be the funding of the implementation of
resolution measures.52
The Deposit Protection Scheme covers all types of deposits
belonging to physical or legal persons, denominated in all
currencies.53 Participation in the Deposit Protection Scheme is
compulsory for all banks and licensed credit institutions in
Cyprus.54 Therefore, BoC and Laiki Banks were institutions
that participated in the Deposit Protection Scheme.55
The Deposit Protection Scheme becomes activated if it is
determined that a particular credit institution is unable to
repay its deposits.56 The amount of each depositor’s existing
deposits are set off against any loans or other credit facilities
granted by the covered institution to the depositor, as well as
any other counterclaim of the bank in respect of which a right
to set off exists.57
Position of Bank Deposits After Cyprus Bail-In
48

Council Directive 94/19, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 5 (EC.).
The European Economic Area (EEA) unites the EU Member States and the three
EEA EFTA States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) into an Internal Market governed
by the same basic rules.
50 “The provision of deposit insurance in the EU (and also in the three EFTA states
that along with the EU nations make up the EEA) is governed by Directive 94/19/EC as
amended by 20009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2009. Directives are legislative acts that specify a result that Member States must
achieve, leaving the form and method up to the Member States. This directive requires
that Member States are to have and monitor a deposit guarantee scheme that protects
most depositors up to € 100,000.” Anne Sibert, Deposit Insurance after Iceland and
Cyprus, VOX (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/deposit-insurance-aftericeland-and-cyprus.
51 Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the Protection, supra note 47.
52 General Terms and Conditions, Laiki Bank, supra note 42.
53 Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the Protection, supra note 47.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the Protection, supra note 47, at 1.
57 Id.
49
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Members of the European Economic Area, which include
the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, are required to set
up deposit-insurance schemes that cover most depositors up to
100,000 €.58 In a ruling by the European Free Trade
Association59 against Iceland (the “IceSave case”), the court
made clear that the deposit protection scheme directive is
meant to cover the failure of individual banks, not a systemic
crisis. In the event of a sufficiently large banking crisis,
depositors may ultimately be protected only up to the ability
and willingness of the sovereign nation to step in with the
necessary funds.60
The Cyprus bail-out has shed even further light at to the
position of deposits during a systemic banking crisis. It
appears that after the Cyprus bail-in, bank deposits, including
insured deposits are not completely safe in the European Union
in the event that a country requires a ‘bail-out’ or
recapitalization. The situation in Cyprus was highly unusual
because the Cypriot government was reported to agree to the
terms of the ‘bail-in’ and may have even suggested coming up
with domestic funds to satisfy the Troika and avert an
economic crisis.61 However, I believe that every financial crisis
is handled urgently and the specific situation that Cyprus
found itself in should not be considered to a great extent. I
believe that the Cyprus bail-in supported the principle
established in the IceSave case because the deposit protection
scheme directive is meant to cover the failure of an individual
bank, and not a systemic crisis.
The IceSave case and the Cyprus events tend to imply that
it is generally accepted that shareholders and depositors
should take losses in the event of a systemic bank failure. The

58

Id.

59See

THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://www.efta.int/aboutefta/european-free-trade-association (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) (noting that the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an intergovernmental organization that promotes free
trade and economic integration to the benefit of its four Member States, and that the
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, enables three of the four EFTA Member
States (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) to participate in the EU’s Internal Market).
60 Case E-16/11, Judgment, (Jan. 28 2013), http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/
user_upload/Files/News/2013/16_11_Judgment.pdf.
61 Deposit Guarantee Schemes, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2013), http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/
9634/1/20130703ATT69107EN.pdf.
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Deposit Protection Scheme is only seen as insurance for ‘small
crises,’ such as the failure of an individual or particular bank.62
However, one questions the fate of unsecured creditors, such as
uninsured bank depositors.63 It appears that uninsured
depositors in European banks may not be spared in the event
the sovereign is in need of a recapitalization of its banks.64
Whether the ‘bail-in’ method is used in future economic crises
will remain to be seen.
It is important to note that the Court of Justice by the EU
has not reviewed the ruling towards Iceland.65 Iceland is not a
member of the European Union and is not subject to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. So,
although there appears to be newly established precedent in
the EU with respect to deposit protection, I do not believe the
IceSave case gives full justification for what occurred in
Cyprus.
ARTICLE 17 OF THE
THE EUROPEAN UNION

CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

Background
Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union states:
1. Everyone has the right to own, use dispose of and
bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may
be deprived of his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one
may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public
interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for
by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for
their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so
far as is necessary for the general interest.
2. Intellectual Property shall be protected.66
62 Anne Sibert, Deposit Insurance after Iceland and Cyprus, VOX (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/deposit-insurance-after-iceland-and-cyprus.
63 Id.
64 See Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Did Cyprus Set A Dangerous Precedent?, RHODIUM
GROUP (Mar. 29, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/did-cyprus-set-a-dangerous-precedent.
65 Id.
66 THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY at 465 (Steve Peers,
Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner & Angela Ward eds., 2014) [hereinafter Peers EU Charter
Commentary].
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Article 17 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental
Rights (Charter) is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),67 enacted in Paris in 1952.68
Article 52(3)69 of the Charter applies requiring interpreting the
meaning and scope of Article 17 in line with Article 1 of the
Additional Protocol to the ECHR. Nonetheless, the Charter
may provide more extensive protection.70
The right to property has been recognized as a
fundamental constitutional right in all Member States of the
EU.71 The judgment Nold (1974) implies recognition of the
right to property as a fundamental right.72 It also stressed that
it would be legitimate to set up certain limits to these rights,
justified by goals of general interest pursued by the
Community, provided that the substance of these rights was
not affected.73
The first judgment dealing with an alleged violation of the
right to property was in case Hauer (1979), which held that the
right to property was guaranteed by common constitutional
concepts of the Member States, which were also reflected in the
Additional protocol to the Convention for the Protection of

67 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 009 [Protocol No. 1] (“Every natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”).
68 Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, at
163,
(June
2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamentalrights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. [hereinafter EU Network of Independent
Experts Commentary].
69 Article 52(3) of The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights reads: “In
so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.
This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” 2000
J.O. (C 364) 1. [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
70 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 469.
71 Id.
72 Case C-4/73, Nold v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
73 Id.
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.74 The Court made
a distinction between measures to the deprivation of property
and to the restriction on the use of property.75 Although the
European Community could not be prevented from a possibility
to control or restrict the use of property in a context of common
market regulation, the Court ruled that the restriction had to
correspond to the general interest and must not be
disproportionate interference for the rights of owner.76
Right to Property
Article 17(1) sentence 1 limits the right to property to
lawfully acquired possessions.77 The right to property may be
claimed by natural as well as legal persons but not by public
law bodies nor for public undertakings.78 Also, property extends
to all pecuniary interests assigned to the individual in their
private interest and as an exclusive entitlement.79 Property is
defined as ‘rights with an asset value creating an established
legal position under the legal system, enabling the holder to
exercise those rights autonomously and for his benefit.’80
Lastly, the right to property covers not only moveable and
immovable property but also immaterial positions including
claims of an economic value, rights of usufruct, liens, company
shares or intellectual property rights.81
As a general rule, the right to property gives protection
only to an existing possession.82 However, there are exceptions
when certain conditions are met. The European Court of
Human Rights has accorded such protection to applicants
having a “legitimate expectation” of collecting an asset,
otherwise known as a receivable.83 However, the notion of a
“legitimate expectation” is limited, because Article 1 of the
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Case C-44/79, Hauer v. Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727.
Id.
Id.
Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 473.
Id.
Id at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 165.
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Protocol does not provide a right to become an owner (i.e. to
acquire ownership).84 Therefore, “legitimate expectation” must
be of a nature more concrete than of “hope” and be based on a
legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision.85
However, if the person has effectively waived their right to
property by explicit and voluntary consent in full awareness of
the circumstances, than there is no deemed interference with
property.86
A reasonable application of the elements of Article 17 to
the Cyprus bail-out generates the conclusion that bank
deposits are considered to be existing, lawfully acquired
property.87 Applying the elements of Article 17(1) sentence 1 to
the facts, we certainly have a situation where the property
owners, i.e. bank depositors, have a right “to own, use, dispose
of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possession.” Bank
deposits are considered existing property under the ECHR
because they are “rights with an asset value creating an
established legal position under the legal system, enabling the
holder to exercise those rights autonomously and for his
benefit.”88 Bank deposits are assets that have value through
the currency they represent, and have an established legal
position under the legal and monetary system. The holder may
do as they wish with their currency such as deposit, withdraw,
or invest.
Furthermore, the Cyprus bail-in obligation was not a
situation where deposit holders effectively waived their right to
property. Effectively waiving one’s right to property requires
an explicit and voluntary consent in full awareness of the
circumstances.89 In the case of Cypriot deposit holders, they
had no choice as to what happened to their deposits because
capital controls were put in place by the Cypriot government,
84

Id.
EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 476.
86 Id.
87
Note that there has been some speculation that a majority of the uninsured
deposits in the Laiki Bank were from Russian money launderers. However, this remains
to be merely speculation. Svetlana Ledyaeva et al. Cyprus, corruption, money laundering
and Russian round-trip investment, VOX (June 17, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org
/article/russian-cyprus-round-tripping-corruption-linked-money-laundering.
88 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 472.
89 Id.
85
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which prevented withdrawals or transfers of their deposits
before and after the bail-in occurred.90 Additionally, the Cypriot
government had imposed a bank holiday during the
negotiations as well as during the implementation of the
conditions.91 Shortly after the conditions were implemented,
depositors were restricted in the amount of money they could
withdraw.92 Even if the option to withdraw money from the
banks were feasible, depositors had no control over the
agreement Cyprus would implement as a result of the
discussions with the Troika. Although the Cypriot parliament
agreed to the terms of the bail-out, no vote occurred among
depositors which would constitute explicit and voluntary
consent and thus a waiver of the right to property under Article
17 of the Charter.
Deprivation of Property
Article 17(1) of the Charter distinguishes between two
specific categories of limitations and derogations: deprivation of
possessions and regulations of the use of property.
“Deprivation of property means a formal expropriation which
may be based on legislative acts or measures implementing
them, i.e. a measure completely and permanently depriving the
owner of their property.”93 One must look to the aim of the
measure in distinguishing measures regulating the use of
property from those depriving a person of their possessions. 94
“A regulation of the use of property does not constitute a
deprivation if the owner of the property remains free to dispose
of it or to put it to other uses which are not prohibited.”‘95
“According to jurisprudence of the Court, a deprivation of
possessions requires not only that a person is deprived of their
property, but also that the latter is transferred to another
person.”96
90 Cyprus eurozone bailout prompts anger as savers hand over possible 10% levy,
REINFORM, http://www.reinform.nl/?p=5333 [hereinafter Reinform].
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 478.
94 Id.
95 Id
96 Id.
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“Deprivation of property covers both de facto deprivation
as well as formal deprivation.”97 A formal deprivation is a
transfer of ownership based on a legal procedure, whereas a de
“In assessing both forms of
facto deprivation is not.98
interference with property, the ECHR attempts to strike a fair
balance between the right of the individual and the general
interest of the community.”99
“Article 17(1) sentence 2 sets up three requirements
necessary to justify a deprivation of possessions.”100 First, the
deprivation of property, “must be based on a sufficiently precise
and accessible legal basis regulating the conditions and
modalities.”101 “Second, the deprivation of possessions must be
However, “if the underlying
in the public interest.”102
objectives are disproportionate in view of the right to property”,
then there can be no deprivation.103
“Third, a fair
compensation for the loss must be paid in good time.”104 A fair
compensation must be calculated on the basis of the current
market value.105 However, exceptional considerations of public
interest, such as the realization of fundamental institutional or
economic reforms or of measures to promote social justice, may
justify a deviation from the full market value.106
The notion of public interest is extensive. The ECHR found
that with respect to the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in
the public interest,’ the margin of appreciation available to the
legislature in implementing social and economic policies should
be wide,
unless that judgment is manifestly without
reasonable foundation.107 The concept of reasonable foundation
means the Court seeks to find a fair balance or a
97

EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166.
Control of Use and Deprivation of Property, ECHR-ONLINE.INFO; http://echronline.info/right-to-property-article-1-of-protocol-1-to-the-echr/control-of-use-anddeprivation-of-property/.
99
Id.
100 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 479.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 480; see also EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra
note 68, at 166.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 480.
106 EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166.
107 Id.
98

15

5 PAUL ARTEMOU (DO NOT DELETE)

220

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/10/2016 9:53 AM

[Vol. 28:1

proportionality between the interest of the community and the
individual right to property.108
When assessing the market value, all circumstances of the
particular case have to be taken into account. One must look at
factors relevant for determining the market value and rules
exclusively privileging the state. One relevant factor would be
an irrebuttable presumption that the value of the property
increased.109
In view of the requirements to pay compensation in good
time and to base expropriations on an adequate legal basis, a
rule determining the amount and the modalities of
compensation has to be set up in advance. Otherwise, the
deprivation of possessions is illegal. “This applies to formal as
well as to de facto expropriations.”110
Compensation following a deprivation of property is also
linked to the notion of “reasonableness.”111 The level of
compensation
is
a
material
factor
in
assessing
proportionality.112 While compensation is necessary in the
taking of property with an amount reasonably related to the
value of the property, public interest considerations may
permit reimbursement of less than the full market value.113 A
total lack of compensation could be justified only in exceptional
circumstances.114
Applying the three requirements of Article 17(1) sentence 2
to the conditions of the Cyprus bail-in, it is difficult to ascertain
whether there was a deprivation of property. I believe the
uninsured bank deposits that remained in Laiki, that were to
stay in the bank, and are to be repaid back to depositors
through liquidation over time may consist of a deprivation of
property. Since the depositors may stand to lose around 80% of
their deposits as a result of the Troika designating Laiki to be

108

Id.
Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481.
110 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481; see also EU Network of
Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166.
111 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
109
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the “bad bank” over BoC.115 Thus, the potential 80% of deposits
that may never be returned may be deemed a deprivation of
property under Article 17.
The first requirement under Article 17 is that a
deprivation of property must be based on a sufficiently precise
and accessible legal basis regulating the conditions and
modalities.116 The Troika relied on Article 136 of the Treaty of
the Functioning of Europe to impose conditions on Cyprus.
Article 136 of the Treaty of the Functioning of Europe reads:
1. In order to ensure the proper functioning of economic
and monetary union, and in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Treaties, the Council shall, in accordance with
the relevant procedure from among those referred to in Articles
121 and 126, with the exception of the procedure set out in
Article 126(14), adopt measures specific to those Member
States whose currency is the euro:
(a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their
budgetary discipline;
(b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, while
ensuring that they are compatible with those adopted for the
whole of the Union and are kept under surveillance.
2. For those measures set out in paragraph 1, only
members of the Council representing Member States whose
currency is the euro shall take part in the vote. A qualified
majority of the said members shall be defined in accordance
with Article 238(3)(a).117
C 326/106 EN Official Journal of the European Union
26.10.2012 Based on Article 136 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of Europe, The Troika had the legal basis to place
conditions on Cyprus that “strengthen the coordination and
surveillance of their budgetary discipline” and set out economic
policy guidelines.118 Therefore, it is clear that the Troika had a

115
Cyprus Finance Minister: Uninsured Laiki Depositors Could Face 80% Haircut,
GREEK REPORTER, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/03/27/cyprus-finance-ministeruninsured-laiki-depositors-could-face-80-haircut/#sthash.PxHBmIdV.dpuf.
116 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 479.
117 Consolidated Version of The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
art. 136, 2012 O.J. 326/ 47, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.
118 Id. at 106.
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legal basis to be able to impose some sort of economic
regulation and condition based on the Cyprus financial crisis.
The second requirement, that deprivation of possessions
must be in the public interest, was arguably met in this
situation with regard to the potentially “lost” uninsured bank
deposits that were to remain in Laiki. The deteriorated
macroeconomic conditions and the lack of bank capital in Laiki
and BoC meant that Cyprus had to come up with some sort of
bailout measure quickly in order for the banking sector to
function again. Essentially, there may not have been much of a
choice in how they could respond. The stability and health of
Cyprus’ economy is clearly a matter of public interest which
would satisfy this prong of Article 17(1).
When considering whether a deprivation of property was
justified because of the public interest, one must analyze
whether the underlying objectives were disproportionate in
view of the right to property.119 In this case, the underlying
objective was to restore the soundness of Cyprus’ financial
sector and restore confidence in the banking industry. If
Cypriot leaders felt that they had no choice but to concede to
the Troika’s demand in levying bank deposits or else face a
systemic collapse in Cyprus, then I believe the underlying
objective was not disproportionate in view of the right to
property.
The third requirement, that fair compensation for the loss
be paid in good time, was also met in this situation. Based on
the restructuring plan outlined in the Memorandum of
Understanding, all insured deposits at Laiki were moved to
BoC. For these deposits, there was arguably no deprivation of
property because the depositors still hold their property in a
different bank. Furthermore, the 37.5% of uninsured deposits
at BOC that were converted to shares in the bank do not
require any compensation because depositors still own the full
value of their property in a different form. However, it is still
uncertain as to whether the depositors with new shares in BoC
may be able to sell their shares at the same market value that
they held their deposits.
With regard to the uninsured deposits in Laiki which were
119

Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 480.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/5

18

5 PAUL ARTEMOU (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/10/2016 9:53 AM

RIGHTS OF EU DEPOSITORS IN CYPRUS

223

to remain in the bank to be liquidated over time, the situation
is more complex. As bank depositor, there will always be the
risk that your deposits will be lost in the event of a bank or
system failure. As a depositor, one is taking a risk when
putting assets into a bank. Banks have deposit insurance
schemes to cover depositors up to a specified amount in the
event the bank fails. Therefore, if Laiki is considered a failed
bank, and Laiki depositors are losing their uninsured portion of
their deposits, then there may be no deprivation of property in
this situation since the depositors assumed the risk in the first
place. Losing your uninsured deposits to a failed bank is a
foreseeable result, however unlikely. As mentioned, depositors
will only be entitled to the insured amounts of their deposits
during a bank failure, and can expect lose all of their deposits
in the case of a financial system crisis.
On the other hand, it was the Troika who designated Laiki
to become the “bad bank”, i.e. the bank that would be
liquidated while its insured deposits get transferred to the
“good bank.” Since Laiki is a failed bank as a result of a
government regulation, it is difficult to accept that the same
standard of risk of bank failure for bank depositors applies.
Rather, it seems that the regulation directly caused a
deprivation of property and should be subject to the protection
of Article 17. However, it is also possible that Laiki would have
inevitably failed if there was no regulation in the first place.
The possibility of any other actions taken by the Cypriot
government are speculative.
Furthermore, many of the uninsured Laiki depositors
stand to lose over 80% of their uninsured deposits since the
liquidation may prove insufficient in repaying the depositors in
full.120 If a European court holds that such losses are to be
considered a deprivation of property under Article 17 of the
Charter, then they are subject to “fair compensation being paid
in good time for their loss.”
Since the uninsured depositors in Laiki deserve “fair
compensation in good time for their loss,” the measures in place
may not meet the obligation of Article 17 by the Troika.
120 Cyprus Finance Minister: Uninsured Laiki Depositors Could Face 80% Haircut,
GREEK REPORTER, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/03/27/cyprus-finance-ministeruninsured-laiki-depositors-could-face-80-haircut/#sthash.PxHBmIdV.dpuf.
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However, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that
“public interest considerations, including measures designed to
achieve greater social justice, may permit reimbursement of
less than the full market value.”121 Furthermore, the Court has
also ruled that “a total lack of compensation could be justified
only in exceptional circumstances.”122
In consideration of the Court’s ruling that greater social
justice may permit reimbursement of less than full market
value, the uninsured Laiki depositors may legally receive less
than their full uninsured deposits. However, it is unclear how
much less than fair market value is acceptable. Potentially
losing 80% of uninsured deposits, especially when dealing with
uninsured deposits in the millions, could be extreme. Also, the
Court is unclear as to what exceptional circumstances would
justify a total lack of compensation.
Regulations of the Use of Property
“Article 17(1) sentence 3 of the Charter permits
regulations of the use of the right to property where they are
provided for by law and necessary for the general interest.”123
“The legal basis must be. . .precise [and] the requirement of
necessity has to be interpreted in. . .light of the
jurisprudence.”124 “A regulation of the use of property has to
meet the ‘proportionality test’, and ‘respect.’” Respect is the
essence of the right to property.125
“The test of proportionality is based on a four-step
approach: [(1)] the legitimate objective, [(2)] appropriateness
(suitability), [(3)] necessity[,] and [(4)] proportionality. . .of the
measure in view of the aims pursued [to] have to be scrutinized
strictu sensu.”126 “In its jurisprudence, the ECJ. . .does not
clearly distinguish these steps. . .”127
“An objective is legitimate if it serves the public good or the

121
122
123
124
125
126
127

EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166.
Id.
Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481.
Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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protection of rights and freedoms of other persons.”128 [These]
objectives may be derived from the general or particular aims
of the [European] Union, from the grounds for justification
established in the context of the fundamental freedoms[,] and
from international obligations. . .”129
Next, the measure must be factually suitable to meet the
objective pursued (contribute to their achievement), and
necessary. “[‘Necessity’] requires that when there is a choice
between several appropriate measures, the least onerous
measure must be used.”130
“[Lastly], a measure is proportionate strictu sensu if the
conflicting interest has been balanced fairly: The interests
involved must be weighed having regard to all the
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair
balance was struck between those interests.”131
The second aspect of the regulation of the use of property
involves “respect.” In other words, one must look at the essence
of the right to property. The guarantee of the essential content
of a right, as distinguished from the proportionality test,
constitutes an ultimate threshold. “The essence of the right to
property is disrespected when the guarantee of property is
deprived of its substance, but not when affected only
marginally or when only modalities of its exercise are
regulated.”132
“The notion of ‘general interest’. . .contains [two]
value[s].”133 On the one hand, the “general interest” is
connected to entrepreneurial activities. On the other hand, it
can be connected to values of social-economic nature.134 “The
prevalence of social aspects in the notion of ‘general interest’
requires that the right to property be subordinate to the aims of
public utility, coinciding with equal relations or with the social

128

Id. at 482.
Id.
130 Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 482.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 485.
133 WILLIAM B.T. MOCK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: COMMENTARY ON THE
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 108 (William B.T. Mock et
al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights in Europe Commentary].
134 Id.
129
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role.”135
The third rule includes the right of the state to control the
use of property.136 It includes the right of the state to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.137 The use
of property is a more general term which seems to cover
various kinds of interference with property.138 It is frequently
disputed whether there has been a “deprivation of possessions”
(second rule) or a “control of use of property” (third rule), as the
former requires greater justification than the latter.139 The
state is free to take measures “as it deems necessary”. The
review by the ECHR limits itself on the issues of legality and
purpose.140
I believe that the insured Laiki deposits and the uninsured
BOC deposits turned equity are regulations of the use of
property under sentence 3 of Article 17. Based on Article 17,
the Cypriot government as well as the Troika were permitted
to regulate the use of property by law in so far as is necessary
for the general interest.
Based on ECHR jurisprudence, a regulation of the use of
property has to meet the proportionality test, and respect, i.e.
the essence of the right to property.141 The test of
proportionality is based on a four step approach, (1) the
legitimate objective, (2) appropriateness (suitability), (3)
necessity, and (4) proportionality of the measure in view of the
aims pursued to have to be scrutinized strictu sensu.142 In its
jurisprudence, the ECJ does not clearly distinguish these
steps.143
Restoring the soundness of the Cypriot banking sector and
rebuilding depositors’ and market confidence is clearly a
legitimate objective. There is virtually no argument that if
Cyprus had not acted quickly on finding a solution, the country

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 66, at 167.
Id.
Id.
Human Rights in Europe Commentary, supra note 133, at 108.
Id. at 167.
See EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166.
Id.
Id.
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would have been in utter turmoil.144 The implementation of
these conditions were necessary and appropriate because
Cyprus had no other option than to agree to the terms of the
Troika or risk the demise of the country’s economy and
financial sector.
Here the proportionality of the measure in view of the aims
pursued would pass stricto sensu scrutiny.145 Stricto sensu
scrutiny requires that “[t]he interests involved must be
weighed having regard to all the circumstances of the case in
order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between
those interests.”146 Here, there is arguably a balance of the
conflicting interests; the conditions imposed in the Cyprus bailout allowed Cyprus to raise the capital required to finance the
BoC to meet the criteria for a € 10 billion bail-out from the
Troika.147 At the same time, a majority of Cypriot depositors
still had possession of their property through ownership of BoC
shares. Additionally, uninsured depositors in either bank were
not deprived of any property at all..148 However, there is a
questionable deprivation of property for uninsured depositors
of Laiki since their compensation depends on the liquidation of
the bank.149 Overall, the bail-in measures satisfied the Troika’s
requests while not severely impacting a majority of the
depositors in the long run.
The second aspect of the regulation of the use of property
involves ‘respect.’150 In this test, the essence of the right to
property is disrespected when the guarantee of property is
deprived of its substance, but not when affected only
marginally or when only modalities of its exercise are
regulated.151 In the case of the Cyprus, I would argue that the
guarantee of property was affected marginally and that
144 See EU finance ministers approve Cyprus bailout deal, USA TODAY (Mar. 25,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2013/03/24/cyprus-eu-bailoutbrussels/ 2014545/; see also Cypriot President says he was forced to accept EU
bailout, EURACTIV.COM (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://beta.euractiv.com/section/eurofinance/news/ cypriot -president-says-he-was-forced-to-accept-eu-bailout/.
145 See Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 482.
146 Id.
147 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1.
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 See Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481.
151 Id. at 485.
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modalities of its exercise were regulated. Thus, the conditions
imposed on Cypriot depositors passed this test of ‘respect.’
In regards to the notion of ‘general interest’ under the
Article, it is clear that the conditions imposed were for the
‘general interest’ of the public. It is in the general interest for
Cyprus to make sure both of its largest banks do not fail
leaving the country in financial ruin and despair.
One may argue that the deposits transferred into equity
should not fall under the scrutiny of Article 17 at all because as
new shareholders of BoC, they can simply sell their shares and
receive their fair market value just as if they withdrew that
money from the bank. However, I would still consider this to be
a regulation by law since it was by regulation that their
deposits were converted into equity. The conversion of deposits
into equity as a legal regulation places it under the scrutiny of
Article 17 of the Charter. Therefore, I believe that the terms of
the Memorandum of Understanding did not violate Article 17,
sentence 3 of the Charter.
BANK DEPOSITS DESERVE A HIGHER STANDARD UNDER
ARTICLE 17
The obligation imposed on Cyprus to levy bank deposits in
return for a bailout was largely unpopular and unprecedented.
My concern with this type of bail-out obligation is the
deterioration of confidence in the banking system of not only
Cyprus, but for the European Union as a whole. Although only
uninsured deposits were materially affected by these
obligations, bank consumers may not feel safe knowing that
there is a risk that any portion of their deposits may be lost
during an economic crisis.
I believe that European courts should hold a higher
standard for bank deposits as a form of property in regard to
Article 17 for two reasons: (1) the special nature of bank
deposits; and (2) for maintaining confidence in the EU banking
system. In keeping these aspects into consideration, the
appropriate body of the European Union should hold that the
levying of bank deposits should not be allowed unless all other
reasonable options have been frustrated, thus leaving a higher
standard in the regulation of bank deposits for the general
interest according to Article 17.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/5

24

5 PAUL ARTEMOU (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/10/2016 9:53 AM

RIGHTS OF EU DEPOSITORS IN CYPRUS

229

Special Nature of Bank Deposits
Various theories arise as to why property in general should
be protected. Modern philosophers such as David Hume and
John Locke make reference to an unattractive state of nature
where property was not protected, and violence among
humanity without such protection was imminent.152 The
protection of property is a social construct and for good reason.
The protection of property brings social order that benefits
everyone in society. Each member of society knows that there
are rules that protect their claim to property and do not have to
fend anyone off to maintain it. However, there are also
situations where society will accept the deprivation or
regulation of property when it is for the public good.
The Cyprus bail-out brings into question whether the
government can pass a regulation whereby bank deposits can
be levied (both insured and uninsured) for the general interest.
Although bank deposits are property, most depositors are
aware of losing that property when there is a risk of a bank
failing
However, I believe that bank deposits have a profound
meaning to our daily lives and deserve special treatment.
People are not expected to stuff their income under their
mattresses; rather, they deposit their income in banks. People
deposit their money into banks is because they believe it is
safe. Banks have a systematic way to keep deposits safe from
fire, theft, and other casualties. Furthermore, people put their
money in banks because deposited funds often grow with
interest. The interest the bank pays to people for keeping their
money in the bank comes from interest that other people pay to
the bank in exchange for being allowed to borrow money.153
Deposits in the banking system are crucial for the growth
of the capitalist economy.154 Money that is deposited is used by
banks for investments that help grow the economy. For
152

STEPHAN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 234 (1991).
Interest
Rate,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/d/deposit-interest-rate.asp.
154 MARTIN WOLFSON AND GERALD EPSTEIN, THE HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 163 (2013); see also Role of banks in the economy,
[ZIMBABWE] HERALD (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.herald.co.zw/role-of-banks-inthe-economy/.
153Deposit
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example, a bank may take 90% of the money deposited by a
particular individual and use that money to make other
investments, such as bank loans to other consumers. Loans by
banks to businesses and other consumers increase consumption
in the economy, which in turn increases GDP.155 Therefore,
deposits have become an effective and major factor in economic
growth.
Another reason why deposits deserve a higher standard is
because the bank depositor should not be expected to know if a
bank is financially solid. A bank depositor expects their
deposits to be untouched, even in the case of an economic crisis.
A bank depositor puts their trust in the banks and the
government to find a solution to an economic crisis without
their deposits being lost.
Furthermore, the bank depositor has the ‘legitimate
expectation’ to collect their deposits. As discussed, ‘legitimate
expectation’ must be of a nature more concrete than of ‘hope’
and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a
judicial decision.156 Depositors do not ‘hope’ that they will be
able to withdraw their deposits at any time. They expect to
withdraw their deposits at any time they wish without any
resistance from the bank or the government. By levying bank
deposits in the form of a regulation, the European Union has
diminished this ‘legitimate expectation’ which is recognized by
law to be sacrosanct.
Although banks are considered businesses that are
dedicated to making a profit in uncertain markets, I do not
believe that society should be unconditionally responsible for
having to make banking decisions and be responsible for those
decisions. While banks are businesses, they should still be
treated as public institutions because of the amount of trust
that patrons put into them, as well as their significance in
maintaining the global economy.
Confidence in the EU Banking System
Consumer banking is a system that is essentially based on
trust. A person walks into a bank and deposits his income. The
155
156

See id.
See EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 165.
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layman is voluntarily giving his property to the bank to hold
for him on the expectation that when he requests his money
again, he will be given the full value of his deposit. This person
most likely does not have any personal relationship to the
managers, tellers, or even executives but he will expect the
bank to hold his deposits safe in their care. In essence, there is
a level of trust and confidence that keeps the banking system
functioning. Without this trust, there is much uncertainty in
how depositors will react in times of crisis. If depositors lose
confidence in the bank’s soundness, they may withdraw their
funds not only from that bank but from other perfectly sound
banks turning banks insolvent and causing an economic
disaster.
Furthermore,
when
government
intervenes
and
manipulates the validity of that trust, then this can have dire
consequences. That government has essentially manipulated
and tarnished the basis of the principles of capitalism and that
level of trust that consumers have in the system. The consumer
will think twice before putting his money in a bank where that
government has acted.
Cyprus was an island in which a majority amount of its
GDP was based on financial services. The fact that the Cypriot
government may take your deposits in the future is a
possibility that will make depositors feel uneasy. If the Troika
can impose such obligations on Cyprus, an EU member, it may
do so to any member. This may include other troubled
countries such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Greece. Depositors
in those countries may want to pull their deposits out which
can cause an even further disruption to the economic system.
While I believe that the Cyprus bail-in allowed the country
gain a bail-out which saved the banks from turning insolvent,
it was still a short term solution that may cause a long term
problem. Foreign investors will not want to enter Cyprus in
longer knowing that their banks may be subject to regulations
whereby their deposits, both insured and uninsured, are at risk
of being lost if another economic crisis looms on the horizon.
Standard for Using Deposits after a Bail-out
Banking deposits under Article 17 require protection under
a much higher standard. When levying deposits in any
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situation, including for obligations related to a bail-out, such
obligation should only be permitted if the regulating body can
‘sufficiently’ show that all reasonable options have been
exhausted and there is no choice but to raise funds through the
levying of bank deposits. Furthermore, if this standard is met,
then that regulating body should only be able to take from
uninsured deposits, and never from insured deposits.
CONCLUSION
The Cyprus bail-in was an unprecedented and largely
unpopular regulation in the European Union’s response to the
Cypriot economic crisis. The bail-in involved the Troika bailing
out the country in return for Cyprus raising € 4.2 billion dollars
through the restructuring of the two largest banks on the
island, and the levying of uninsured bank deposits in those
banks.
It is clear that the rights of EU depositors have been
altered as a result of the events of the Cyprus bail-out. Bank
deposits are no longer completely safe from the negative effects
of a financial crisis, especially in the EU.
I believe that the levying of banks deposits by the Cypriot
government was legal under Article 17 of the Charter because
there was neither an improper deprivation of property nor a
regulation by the government without regard to the general
interest. Insured deposits in both banks were untouched
satisfying the banks Cyprus’ deposit guarantee schemes.
Furthermore, the uninsured deposits, although potentially
subject to loss, are never guaranteed to be paid back in the
event of a bank failure, meaning that there was no deprivation
of property under Article 17. Also, the regulation that may
eventually lead to losses in those deposits have followed the
legal elements of Article 17. However, although the levying of
bank deposits in Cyprus was legal under Article 17, I believe
that the European Union should hold a higher standard to
deposits under Article 17 because of the special nature of bank
deposits and their importance to the EU economy as a whole.
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